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I. INTRODUCTION
In Guinn v. Legislature of Nevada,1 decided on September 17, 2003, the
Nevada Supreme Court issued what may be among the most widely-read dis-
missals of a petition for rehearing. The case involved a clash of state constitu-
tional provisions. On the one hand, the Nevada Constitution provides that
revenue and tax bills must pass by a two-thirds majority of the State Senate and
the State Assembly. a On the other hand, the Nevada Constitution requires both
a balanced budget and full funding of education.3 Guinn arose when the
Nevada Legislature was able to pass, by a simple majority, a balanced budget
to fund education but was unable to clear the supermajority hurdle imposed on
the associated revenue bill necessary to pay for majority-approved
expenditures.
The impasse was resolved when the Nevada Supreme Court held that the
"procedure" of the supermajority requirement would have to yield to the "sub-
stance" of the balanced budget requirement.4 Armed with this opinion, the
Nevada Legislature passed, by a simple majority, a revenue bill that balanced
the budget. The September 2003 Guinn case was the result of action following
the Legislature's passage of the bill and essentially was an attempt to rehear the
matter. Given the Legislature's passage of the revenue bill, the Nevada
Supreme Court took the expedient route and declared the petition moot.
5
The case is intriguing from a variety of perspectives. At the outset, it
bears mention that legislation and law-making are not always pretty. To my
constitutional law colleagues, it is both grist for the tie-breaking mechanisms
* Professor of Law and Academic Dean, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. Special thanks to my colleagues David Faigman and Evan Lee for their insight and
inspiration in connection with the constitutional principles touched on in this Essay. I am
also grateful for the diligent and able assistance provided by Karina Kowler, Catherine
Paskoff Chang, and Simone Katz.
1 76 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2003).
2 NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 18, cl. 2; Guinn, 76 P.3d at 25-26.
3 Id. at 29.
4 More specifically, the Nevada Supreme Court in Guinn draws "a distinction between sub-
stantive requirements of the government and procedural requirements of the legislative pro-
cess." Robert Ward Shaw, The States, Balanced Budgets, and Fundamental Shifts in
Federalism, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1195, 1226 (2004).
5 Guinn, 76 P.3d at 33.
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that constitutional law provides and the stuff of high theory.6 For these schol-
ars, it is instructive that Guinn harkens to the roots of the Republic by its refer-
ence to Marbury v. Madison7 as guidance for resolution of the impasse.
The case is also intriguing because it showcases the clash between revenue
and politics. This clash is not new. Indeed, in the early days of the nation,
Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the power to tax depended on the popu-
lace's confidence that it would not be abused.8 The enduring relevance of Mar-
shall's assessment is borne out by the observation of presidential biographer
and syndicated columnist Richard Reeves that "No one remembers whether
Lincoln balanced the budget." 9 Reeves' statement is a remarkable insight into
the legacy of governments, presidencies, and presidents.
Reeves actually makes two separate points. First, he makes the almost
obvious observation that Presidents and political leaders are remembered not
for their fiscal prowess but for their leadership under crisis. Lincoln, thus, is
remembered for his extraordinary leadership at a key juncture of the Nation's
history.'" Second, the corollary observation is that, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
notwithstanding, fiscal adeptness does not constitute a mark of lasting
leadership.
Though Reeves' observation is also a remarkable insight into the tension
illustrated by Guinn, as it turns out, the laboratory of political reality has shown
that Reeves' formulation both proves too much and not enough. That is, while
Reeves is right in stating that fiscal accomplishments can be overshadowed by
other events, he underestimates the modem trend among government leaders to
politicize fiscal matters that affect us and our future.
In the course of this Essay, I begin with a broad-brush description of the
politics and rhetoric of taxation and then address the limitations that arise from
general ignorance of tax policy when placed in this political and rhetorical con-
text. I conclude that citizens and legislators have no choice but to become
more responsible in fiscal matters. My aim is not to be exhaustive in this dis-
cussion, though surely there is a wealth of material and data to support my
thesis. Rather, it is my goal to make a small contribution to a dialogue that has
not yet gained currency among either the taxed or the taxers. As Professor
Nancy Staudt has stated, the debate over responsibility is missing."l My hope,
6 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (expressing a preference for later
enacted constitutional provisions); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (establishing
that, despite the "independent constitutional bar" limitation, Congress may use its spending
power to indirectly achieve objectives that it does not have the power to achieve directly).
Because I cannot be described as a close student of constitutional law, my explorations in
this respect depend on those of my colleagues whom I acknowledge above.
7 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
9 Richard Reeves, Down and Out in the Global Workplace, BALT. SUN, Oct. 15. 1996, at
7A. The full quote is "No one remembers whether Abraham Lincoln balanced the budget in
fiscal year 1862." Id.
'o Lincoln did, in fact, balance the budget. It appears that for the fiscal year ending June 20,
1861, there existed a surplus of over $2 million. 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 39 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
'" Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919,
979 (1997).
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as Professor Jeff Stempel has also expressed, is that the focus on Guinn will
foster an ongoing conversation. 12
II. POLITICS
The 1996 Republican Presidential hopeful Steve Forbes, labeled a lacklus-
ter campaigner by his supporters and detractors alike, made tax criticism a cen-
terpiece of his campaign. 3 Despite his charismatic failings, Forbes managed
to excite his audiences with variations of his stump speech refrain, "[y]ou can't
tinker with the tax code. You can't reform it. You must kill it, drive a stake
through its heart, bury it and hope that it never rises again." 4 Forbes' assertion
that the present tax system is intolerably complicated, burdensome, and unfair
never failed to get a rousing response.15
The rhetoric that gave life to the Forbes campaign was not new. Professor
Marvin Chirelstein noted that President Reagan based a successful political
career on campaigning against taxes. 16 According to Chirelstein, President
Reagan began railing against the progressive income tax in the early 1960s and
maintained a consistent level of rhetoric against the system of taxation through-
out his presidency.17 President Reagan's success came in part from his direct
attack on an unpopular foe, the progressive tax.
In the same way, the experience of the first President Bush is also instruc-
tive. As many will recall, at the 1988 Republican National Convention, Presi-
dent Bush made his now signature pledge, "Read my lips," a part of his resolute
position against raising taxes.18 The same President Bush later was forced by
the economy to stand by and let Congress raise taxes to reduce potential budget
deficits - effectively recanting his pledge. 9 While the recantation may have
been for sound reasons, it contributed to his subsequent defeat by a then
obscure Arkansas governor, William Jefferson Clinton.2" For President Bush,
12 Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Most Rational Branch: Guinn v. Legislature and the Judiciary's
Role as Helpful Arbiter of Conflict, 4 NEV. L.J. 518 (2004).
13 Elizabeth Kolbert, Forbes' Silver Bullet for the Nations Malaise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
1996, at 1; Neil A. Lewis, Flat Tax, Once Obscure Idea, Is Set to Enter Campaign Debate,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1996, at 7.
"4 Thomas B. Edsall, GOP's Tax Code Termination Act Hits Snag; Poll Shows Majority
Swayed by Democratic Criticism that Plan Is Reckless, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1998, at A4.
" Edward Walsh, Republican Presidential Hopefuls Gang Up on Forbes; Wealthy Chal-
lenger's Flat Tax Proposal Attacked as Costly, "Nutty" in Iowa Debate, WASH. POST, Jan.
14, 1996, at Al; Howard Kurtz, GOP Candidates Field Ads Attacking Forbes Tax Plan;
Wealthy Publisher's Spot Urges Voters to Join 'Crusade', WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1996, at
A2; Randy Kennedy, No Endorsement, But Scorn for Flat Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at
B6.
16 Marvin A. Chirelstein, The Flat Tax Proposal - Will Voters Understand the Issues?, 2
GREEN BAG 2d 147 (1999).
17 Id. at 148-49.
18 Paul Taylor, Bush's Vivid Self-Portrait; Caring, Practical Everyman Depicted, WASH.
POST, Aug. 19, 1988, at Al.
19 George Will, Deficit Goes Up, Bush Goes Down, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 14,
1990, at D2.
20 Ann Devroy, Domestic Perils Sink President in Last Campaign, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
1992, at A21; Charles Krauthammer, Trapped by Campaign Rhetoric, WASH. POST, Feb. 26,
1993, at A23.
[Vol. 4:510
Spring 2004] LEGISLATION AND DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE 513
the reversal of his position was fatal to his presidential aspirations.21 To the
extent that revenue-raising is a proxy for budget balancing, President Bush's
fate illustrates that the voters' memories were very much occupied with the
budget.22
Professor Marjorie Kornhauser has covered some of this same ground.23
Her perspective, one that accounts primarily for taxpayers' reactions to being
taxed, is neither a surprising nor an unusual take on the situation. For example,
one of the leading treatises on tax policy states that "tax law is always a com-
promise among the view of powerful individuals and groups."'24 Still, it pro-
ceeds on the tacit assumption that government desires to tax and that its efforts
will be thwarted by the taxed. Similarly, another leading treatise on tax policy
recognizes that "the prevalence of government may reflect the presence of
political and social ideologies which depart from the premises of consumer
choice and decentralized decisions. '2 1 It recognizes that, in the real world,
there may very well be a disconnect between the system of taxation and the
expectations of the populace. At the same time, it does not deal with situations
described by Guinn, in which government efforts to tax are thwarted internally,
essentially by the taxers themselves.
This phenomenon is more insidious. The creation of a supermajority
requirement to pass revenue legislation, whether by legislative fiat or by the
initiative process, allows a minority extraordinary control over government fis-
cal policy.2 6 As Max Minzner explains, "Tax supermajority requirements not
only prevent action; they endorse a particular set of policy decisions. They
privilege the existing tax structure. Depending on the extent to which they can
be waived . . . supermajority requirements allow a current majority to lock in
the status quo, inflating their power with respect to future majorities."2"
Until Guinn, judicial bias favored a large degree of deference to law-mak-
ing. The philosophy is explained by the view that "even improvident decisions
will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial interven-
21 It seems that the younger President Bush is following in his father's footsteps by taking
on the tax policies of his opponent. Richard W. Stevenson, At Rally in Vital State, Bush
Attacks Kerry on Economy, N.Y. TIMES, MAR. 21, 2004, at 18. Though the current President
Bush's attack is not as pure as President Reagan's, the subtext of the message is the same:
taxes are inherently evil.
22 Jeffrey Schmalz, Words on Bush's Lips in '88 Now Stick in Voter's Craw, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 1992, at 1.
23 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Pro-
tests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 819 (2002).
24 JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 38 (5th ed. 1987).
25 RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 5 (5th ed. 1973).
26 Since 1996, the U.S. House of Representatives has rejected on an almost annual basis a
proposal to create a constitutional amendment requiring a supermajority for tax hikes. As
Rep. Martin Frost (D-Tex.) noted, if this constitutional amendment were passed, "it would
allow a relatively small minority, one-third plus one, to stop widely supported, meaningful
legislation." House Debates, Rejects Tax Limitation Amendment, 96 TAX NOTES 93 (2002).
27 Max Minzner, Entrenching Interests: State Supermajority Requirements to Raise Taxes,
14 AKRON TAX J. 43, 49 (1999). See also David Brunori, Supermajority Remains a Bad
Idea, 30 ST. TAx NOTES 39 (2003): "[T]he very notion of supermajorities has an undemo-
cratic flavor. Requiring two-thirds of the legislature to approve tax increases actually pro-
vides an advantage to the minority."
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tion is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely [a court] might think a
political branch has acted."'28 The difficulty, as Guinn illustrates, is that the
democratic process is not necessarily up to this task. The resulting impasse
wrought by the supermajority requirement brings about an irreversible harm. 29
Or, as Professor David Brunori succinctly cautions, "what was intended to pro-
tect the citizen's pocketbook from the rapacious government could end up
preventing the enactment of programs supported by a majority of those
citizens."30
III. PUBLIC PERCEPTION
The advent of supermajority requirements seems to have flourished in the
crucible of public ignorance about taxes and the taxing system. While the ideas
of paying taxes and paying for benefits have always been uncomfortably juxta-
posed, there is no great mystery to the smooth fiscal functioning of govern-
ment. Reduced to the simplest components, fiscal responsibility in
government, like any household budget, requires that revenue be adequate to
pay for expenditures.3 1 Though this Essay focuses on the adequacy of the reve-
nue generation mechanism, I am grateful that my colleague Professor Steve
Johnson has ably emphasized the need to control expenditures.3 2
Empirical studies of the public's perceptions of tax systems demonstrate
that the popular concept of taxation diverges significantly from reality. It is
nothing short of surprising to observe the extent to which otherwise well-
informed people misperceive taxes and the system of taxation. 33 In one promi-
nent study, Michael Roberts and Peggy Hite discovered that, though the public
may believe current taxation to be unfair, when asked to specify what income-
based rate structure would be fair, respondents tended to choose rates remarka-
bly similar to those actually in place.34 Specifically, when asked an open-
ended question regarding the level of taxation that would be "fair" for nine
income levels, ranging from $5,000 to $100,000, respondents, on average,
chose rates that were the same or higher than those that were in place at the
time.35 As the authors note, this conclusion is striking given the widely held
view that tax burdens are too high.
28 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1992) (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
(1979)).
29 Indeed, one Nevada legislator noted that the supermajority provision "was actually
empowering a smaller group of people not to fund the budget." Guinn v. Legislature, 76
P.3d 22, 26 (Nev. 2003) (quoting Hearing on A.J.R. 21 Before the Assembly Comm. on
Taxation, 67th Leg. (Nev. 1993)).
30 David Brunori, Supermajority Remains a Bad Idea, 30 ST. TAx NOTES 39 (2003).
31 Professor Steve Johnson points out that this simple formula is expressed in the Nevada
Constitution: "The legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient to defray the
estimated expenses of the state." NEV. CONST. art. 9, § 2, cited in Steve R. Johnson,
Supermajority Provisions, Guinn v. Legislature, and a Flawed Constitutional Structure, 4
NEV. L.J. 491, 497 (2004).
32 Id. at 305.
33 See Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 147-48.
14 Michael L. Roberts & Peggy Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness, and Compliance, 16
LAW & PoL'Y 27, 32 (1994).
35 Id. at 32.
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Part of the problem is that taxpayers appear unaware of actual tax rates,
even when they unwittingly are endorsing those rates. These estimates consist-
ently have been found to be low outside of the respondent's immediate bracket.
For instance, the public is generally in favor of progression and believes the
rich are not paying their "fair share." When asked to estimate what a high-
income family pays, however, respondents underestimate real rates by almost
two-thirds.36 The individual perception seems to be "I am paying my share,
others are not."37
Though respondents in the Roberts and Hite study could generally be bro-
ken down into three relatively equal groups regarding their tax allocation pref-
erences - flat raters, mild progressives, and steep progressives 38 - the majority
of these respondents preferred a graduated to a flat-tax rate.39 Perhaps this
explains why fairness is such a tough nut to crack when it comes to determining
an equitable allocation of tax burdens. With the nation split fairly evenly into
thirds among those favoring various rate structures, cries of unfairness will
arise no matter what rate structure is imposed.
A further question then arises in regard to perception. Are real rates
reflective of public preference or is public preference reflective of real rates? Is
it simply a coincidence that a majority of the public tends to prefer the current
rate structure, even if they apparently are unaware of it? Analysts in various
fields have noted that psychological evidence shows preferences are context
dependent.4 ° For example, one Swedish study found that, over a period of
actual rate decline in Swedish taxes, individuals' expressed preferences for
rates fell at a one to one ratio with their expressed perceptions of actual rates.4"
36 JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE GREAT
DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 61-62 (2d ed. 2000):
For example, a June 1996 Roper poll asked the public to estimate how much personal income tax
was actually paid by families of four with various income levels. The respondents' median
estimate of the tax bill for a hypothetical family making $50,000 was $7,000, or 14 percent of
income, not far from the actual 12 percent rate. But the median estimate of the tax bill for a
family with $200,000 in income was only $15,000, or 7.5 percent compared to the actual rate of
21 percent, nearly three times as high! .. .In a 1989 survey, on average, respondents believed
that 45 percent of millionaires paid no income tax at all. IRS statistics showed the actual figure
was less than 2 percent. Thus, the professed desire for more progressivity may in part stem from
a lack of understanding of how progressive the system is now.
7 One is reminded of the Russell Long aphorism, "Don't tax you, don't tax me, tax that
fellow behind the tree." ROBERT MANN, LEGACY TO POWER: SENATOR RUSSELL LONG OF
LOUISIANA 333 (1992).
38 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 36, at 36. In the study, 34% of those polled preferred a
flat 20% tax rate as the most fair option, 28% chose the mildly progressive 1987-1991 rate
schedule, and 33% preferred the more steeply progressive 1981-1986 rate schedule as the
most fair.
39 Id. at 35 (citations omitted). In the study, 60% of the people polled agreed that graduated
tax rates are most fair, while 33% preferred a flat rate, and 7% were indifferent between the
two.
4o See, e.g., Steven M. Sheffrin, What Does the Public Believe About Tax Fairness?, 46
NAT'L TAX J. 301, 303 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 1861 (1994).
41 Sheffrin, supra note 40, at 302, citing Richard Wahlund, Perception & Judgment of Mar-
ginal Tax Rates After a Tax Reduction, in UNDERSTANDING EcoNoMIc BEHAVIOR 135 (K.G.
Grunert & F. Olander eds., 1989). Interestingly, Swedish taxpayers not only underestimated
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In other words, when taxes were very high, the public preferred higher rates
(although not quite as high as the actual rates). When rates fell, people pre-
ferred slightly lower rates, in exact proportion to the amount of perceived real
decline.
What does this mean for those seeking to create a tax system that is both
fair and capable of raising revenue? Roberts and Hite conclude that "the gen-
eral public is not knowledgeable about effective tax rates," and that perceptions
of the inherent unfairness of the tax system may have more to do with hyping
of marginal rates by the media and amongst politicians, than with the rate struc-
ture itself.4"
Professor Steven Sheffrin has suggested that rather than despair over the
public's misperceptions and biases, politicians should seek to spin sound tax
policy in such a way that it conforms to these biases.4 3 Some might call this
trickery, others might call it paternalism: if the child does not understand what
is good for her, it might be necessary to dress the truth up a little."
Other tax policy experts, recognizing the challenge posed by the desire
both to minimize tax burdens and to provide needed government benefits, have
taken a similar path. In a keynote address at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the
California Tax Bar and the California Tax Policy Conference, Thomas F. Field,
the founder of Tax Analysts, 45 advocated the enactment of tax legislation
aimed at those taxes that do not draw public attention; sales taxes and con-
sumption taxes are prime examples.4 6
The trouble with these approaches is that they depend on an assumption
that politicians, executives, and legislators are in fact interested in sound tax
policy and a fiscal system that is capable of responsibly raising revenue. When
the taxers are instead interested in subverting the tax system, the "spinning"
that occurs seems to take public misperception in the direction to which it is
naturally inclined: that of mistrust of the taxers and disdain for their tax system.
Moreover, the resort to taxes that are not on the public's radar screen, assuming
legislators can be persuaded to go along, can only delay what will inevitably be
a rebellion against these heretofore "silent taxes."
The majority of the voting public remains, for the most part, ignorant of
various important details of the tax system; the above-described difference
between marginal and effective rates or between tax burden and tax incidence
are examples. If less media attention and punditry were devoted to decrying
the evils of the Internal Revenue Code, and more to educating taxpayers on just
actual marginal tax rates before and after the decline in rates, but also underestimated the
decrease in marginal rates.
42 See Roberts & Hite, supra note 34, at 40.
43 Sheffrin, supra note 40, at 306-07.
4 One is reminded of the aphorism that "[t]he art of taxation consists in so plucking the
goose as to get the most feathers with the least hissing." JEAN BAPTIST COLBERT, THE
HARPER BOOK OF QUOTATIONs 434 (Robert I. Fitzhenry ed., 3d ed. 1993), cited in Brian G
Ritz, Nexus on the Net: A Taxing Question, 36 DUQ. L. REv. 921 (1998).
" Tax Analysts is a nonprofit corporation with the self-described mission of "helping the
country tax its citizens fairly, simply, and efficiently" and to "stir up great tax policy
debate." The organization's website is http://www.taxanalysts.com (last visited June 13,
2004).
46 Thomas F. Field, The Emperor Has No Clothes, 101 TAX NoTEs 1125 (2003).
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how the Code works, perhaps this Essay would be unnecessary. Again, if more
attention were given to the many benefits and necessities of daily life (for rich,
poor, and everyone in between) that depend on tax revenue (including roads,
schools, police and fire services), the job of legislators implementing taxes
could be easier. My central point is simply this: absent the persistent frothing
over "government sponsored theft" and the pillaging of the American public by
out-of-control government, most taxpayers probably would be hard-pressed to
squawk about or even to identify a tax injustice.
Unfortunately, as demonstrated by Guinn v. Legislature of Nevada, the
apparent ease by which supermajority requirements have been implemented to
impede the enactment of necessary tax legislation is an appalling phenomenon.
The public is complicit in its ignorance. Having said this, I understand the
frustrations involved. To create supermajority tax provisions is not an irra-
tional response to spending that sometimes seems uncontrolled. Fiscal respon-
sibility and accountability are worthy aims. However, the creation of
supermajority provisions addresses the problem with a tool that is too crude.
Perhaps, with more understanding of the ramifications of the supermajority
phenomenon, the public would not be so susceptible to the rhetoric of revenue
and politics and would be less willing to embrace supermajority requirements.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justices Holmes and Brandeis observed that "[t]axes are what we pay for
civilized society."47 Their altruistic view is the approach we must embrace. If
taxes are indispensable to government, it follows that taxation is a responsibil-
ity of citizenship.48 More to the point, however, it is the responsibility of legis-
lators, citizens acting as legislators, and executives not to undermine the role
that taxes play in our system of government.
With this background, my belief is that Guinn has a utility. It provides a
vehicle for discussion and, even with the crisis that precipitated, it serves to
heighten awareness of taxes and the system of taxation. In the end, I agree with
Professor Kornhauser's astute view that legislators must lead and not merely
mirror uncritical and unreflective public anti-tax sentiment.49
47 Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes &
Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
48 Staudt, supra note 11, at 979-91.
4' Komhauser, supra note 23, at 929.
